Loans Outpace Trains: How Egypt’s Tunnels Authority Ran Up EGP 2 Trillion in Debt

The National Authority for Tunnels (NAT) had accumulated debts exceeding EGP 2 trillion by mid-2026. In June, Egypt’s House of Representatives approved a further €3.90243 billion loan from European banks, backed by Germany’s Hermes export-credit guarantee, to finance the second and third lines of the high-speed electric railway.

This followed parliamentary approval, three months earlier, of four financing agreements worth $332 million to complete the light rail transit (LRT) project. In November 2024, NAT had also obtained EGP 4.5 billion in loans and credit facilities from Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Arab Bank for the monorail and LRT.

In the 2026/27 budget figures cited in this report, NAT accounts for EGP 257.727 billion out of EGP 459.253 billion in loans and credit facilities for economic authorities: approximately 56.1%, rather than the “about 60%” rounded figure in the Arabic text. Transport Minister Kamel El-Wazir said in televised remarks in March 2026 that borrowing for national railway and metro projects alone had reached about $18 billion.

Established under Law No. 113 of 1983, NAT has reported losses for several years. Chairman Tarek Goweily put its 2021/22 losses at EGP 1.3 billion; reports cited in the Arabic version give EGP 1.896 billion for 2022/23. Long-term liabilities and amounts owed to suppliers reportedly reached EGP 105.5 billion by 2023/24, an increase of EGP 31.2 billion over the preceding year.

The statistical statement accompanying the state budget put NAT’s 2024/25 losses at more than EGP 44 billion. The 2026/27 statement cited in the report identifies it as the largest loss-maker among 59 economic authorities, accounting for 66.3% of their combined EGP 96.9 billion losses. These figures refer to different financial years and should not be treated as a single annual result.

Other official figures quoted in the Arabic report show revenue of EGP 3.166 billion in 2021/22 against activity costs of approximately EGP 651 million: EGP 193 million in wages and EGP 458.2 million for fuel, materials and spare parts. They describe an activity profit of EGP 2.515 billion, followed by profits of EGP 3.536 billion in 2022/23, nearly EGP 3 billion in 2023/24 and EGP 4.350 billion in 2024/25. The report does not reconcile the accounting scope of these profit figures with the loss figures above; they cannot be read as interchangeable measures.

The authority faces a large funding gap. The figures cited put expenditure at approximately EGP 74 billion and revenue at EGP 8.8 billion—a difference of EGP 65.2 billion. The Arabic report also mentions EGP 63 billion, subsequently identified by MP Mahmoud Sami El-Imam as interest costs, rather than the arithmetical revenue–expenditure gap. NAT’s total 2026/27 budget estimates reach EGP 430.823 billion, up from EGP 351.127 billion in 2025/26: an increase of EGP 79.696 billion, or 22.7%.

This gap of approximately EGP 65 billion, alongside the authority’s debt stock, prompted El-Imam to warn Parliament of a genuine financial crisis requiring comprehensive restructuring and a clear repayment strategy before further commitments are added.

He argues that the figures make NAT’s continuing classification as an economic authority difficult to sustain. With EGP 8.8 billion in revenue against nearly EGP 74 billion in spending—including about EGP 63 billion in debt interest—he considers it unrealistic to expect NAT to meet its obligations in the near or medium term, particularly while new projects require further borrowing.

He tells Zawia3 that part of the crisis stems from converting a public-service body into an economic authority, even though its work cannot generate sufficient direct financial returns to cover financing costs. He proposes restructuring it and bringing it back into the state budget. Its projects seek social and developmental benefits, including opening up new areas, encouraging industrial and agricultural investment and moving people into new urban communities. Those benefits accrue indirectly to the economy, without necessarily producing revenue for NAT itself.

“The authority currently oversees four major capital-intensive projects: the metro, monorail, light rail and high-speed electric railway. These require huge investments that cannot be recovered through ticket prices, even after the latest increases. Continuing to classify the authority as an economic authority is therefore impractical,” he says.

Limited resources, El-Imam argues, require spending priorities to be reconsidered. Completing metro projects should take precedence because they directly serve millions of people. Other projects, such as the monorail and some high-speed railway phases, could have been deferred until public finances improved.

“The second phase of the high-speed railway, connecting areas with greater needs, should have been prioritised ahead of the first. The monorail also raises questions about feasibility, given that its routes pass through areas that still have low population density,” he adds.

He links rising losses principally to debt-service costs rather than weak operating revenue. In his assessment, the proximity between the reported losses and interest payments indicates that borrowing has exceeded the authority’s financial capacity to repay.

El-Imam proposes two alternatives. NAT could return to public-service status, with the state budget assuming its debts and financing commitments. Alternatively, operating expenditure could be separated from financing costs: fares would cover day-to-day wages, energy and maintenance, while the state would bear interest costs arising from national development projects that cannot be assessed solely by commercial profitability.

In 2020, NAT was converted from a service authority into an economic authority with a budget separate from the state’s general budget, allowing it to invest its funds and undertake activities intended to cover spending and maintenance.

In 2025, the government announced plans to restructure economic authorities and reduce their number from 59 to 30, bringing some back into the state budget. An announced restructuring plan should not, by itself, be taken as proof that every proposed merger or reclassification had already been completed.

Misplaced spending priorities

The report puts total LRT financing between January 2019 and March 2026 at about $1.6 billion through international loans and local contributions. It cites $1.239 billion for phases one and two, alongside financing components of approximately $674 million and $53 million from China’s Ministry of Commerce. The components listed do not constitute a full breakdown of the stated total. Repayment terms extend to around 20 years, with grace periods of two to ten years and concessional interest of 1.8–2%. In September 2023, China Eximbank approved a further $400 million for phase three.

The Arabic report estimates the monorail’s total cost at €4.5 billion. For comparison, Orascom’s 2019 consortium announcement values the broader design-build-operate-maintain contract at more than $4.5 billion (€4.1 billion), covering a different contractual scope; the euro and dollar figures must not be treated as interchangeable. It also cites a €1.88 billion international loan from a bank consortium led by JPMorgan, supported by UK export-credit backing of approximately £1.7 billion. These are different financing and contract measures, rather than amounts to be added together. NAT reportedly borrowed a further EGP 5 billion from Egyptian banks in 2025 for civil and construction works undertaken by Orascom Construction and Arab Contractors.

Loans for the high-speed railway connecting the New Administrative Capital and Ain Sokhna with Alexandria and the Mediterranean are put at approximately €2.9 billion. The financing components specified include €2.26 billion from international institutions and a €318 million direct loan from the Islamic Development Bank. Together, those two components total €2.578 billion; they do not provide a complete reconciliation of the stated €2.9 billion.

Presidential Decree No. 145 of 2023 approved financing agreements for the first high-speed railway line. These included €1.99 billion in European bank loans backed by the German export-credit agency and a further €268.8 million backed by the Italian export-credit agency.

MP Diaa El-Din Dawoud considers NAT’s revenue–expenditure gap fundamentally a problem of public-spending priorities. His opposition to expansion in several national projects rests on what he calls an understanding of priorities, a position taken by the opposition—including the 25–30 parliamentary bloc—since the projects began under the governments of Sherif Ismail and Mostafa Madbouly.

After years of political upheaval, he tells Zawia3, more resources should have gone into health, education and human capabilities as the foundations of sustainable development, instead of projects heavily dependent on imported components. In his view, underinvestment in industry, education and scientific research maintained dependence on foreign suppliers for major projects, raising costs and the need to borrow foreign currency.

“Modern transport projects such as the high-speed railway and monorail are, in principle, advanced forms of transport society needs. But their timing and the scale of expansion were disputed because they depend on expensive external financing. Debt service has come to absorb a large share of budget expenditure, limiting the resources available for other sectors,” he says.

Dawoud stresses that public transport should not be evaluated solely through direct profitability. It is a basic state obligation that improves economic mobility, reduces congestion and raises productivity. Without the metro, he argues, Cairo would face traffic and economic paralysis, given its role in getting people to work and services.

At the same time, new projects require close assessment of the state’s financial capacity and development priorities. Realising ambitions such as the monorail and electric railway should depend on the economy’s ability to bear their cost and on how efficiently they can serve large numbers of people.

On continued borrowing to finish existing projects, he argues that work already under way should be completed: stopping after billions of pounds have been spent would waste those investments, while operation could deliver some intended economic and social returns. Starting additional projects, however, requires comprehensive review. He calls for a rethink of spending and borrowing, and more consultation and study before major implementation decisions.

He sees the problem as extending beyond NAT to a broader economic-planning approach: expensive projects dependent on foreign currency whose direct returns take longer to emerge than those of productive investments such as ports and industrial zones, which can generate revenue and employment sooner.

Senator Amira Saber Kandil argues that NAT should be assessed in light of its public-service role. Public transport’s primary purpose is to provide a service, rather than earn profits. A surplus would be welcome, but should not be the main measure of performance.

She identifies untapped opportunities to increase revenue without raising fares: commercial assets within stations, including shops, restaurants, cafés and other services, as well as advertising. Many transport networks elsewhere rely heavily on such sources, she says, but Egypt has not made sufficient use of them.

“Increasing transport prices has not necessarily improved service quality,” she tells Zawia3, citing what she describes as deteriorating maintenance on Metro Line 1. Operating and maintenance efficiency, she says, should improve alongside any fare increases.

For Kandil, the issue is not borrowing in itself, but its scale and investment priorities. In her assessment, Egypt has passed safe borrowing limits while directing large investments towards projects that may not be the most urgent priorities.

Infrastructure remains essential to the economy, investment, connections between governorates and transport, she adds. But assessment should consider opportunity cost: the economic and social returns that the same resources might produce if directed towards more urgent or effective alternatives. This comparison should inform decisions about expensive transport expansion.

Losses continue despite higher fares

Metro fares have risen repeatedly over the past two decades, reaching their highest levels in 2026, without resolving the financial losses discussed in this report. When the metro opened on September 27, 1987, a flat ticket cost ten piastres. Later increases brought fares to 25–75 piastres in 2002 and EGP 1 in 2006, regardless of the number of stations on the Helwan–El-Marg route or Line 2. In March 2017, the flat fare doubled to EGP 2. Distance-based pricing followed in 2018: EGP 3 for nine stations, EGP 5 for 16 and EGP 7 for longer journeys.

In June 2019, fares on Line 3 were set at EGP 5 for up to nine stations, EGP 7 for up to 16 and EGP 10 beyond that, while fares on Lines 1 and 2 initially stayed unchanged. Further increases followed in 2020. The Arabic report describes bands ranging from EGP 3–7 and EGP 5–10, with increases of 40–67%; these should be read in the context of the different lines and journey lengths, rather than as one flat fare.

NAT acquired 51% of the Egyptian Company for Metro Management and Operation in March 2022. Fares increased twice in 2024: in January to EGP 6–15, and in August to EGP 8–20. The report lists the 2025 bands as EGP 8 for up to nine stations, EGP 10 for up to 16, EGP 15 for up to 23 and EGP 20 for longer journeys. These are the same bands listed after August 2024, so the figures provided do not establish a separate new increase in 2025.

On March 27, 2026, the Transport Ministry raised the first two bands: up to nine stations increased from EGP 8 to EGP 10 (25%), and up to 16 from EGP 10 to EGP 12 (20%). Fares remained EGP 15 for up to 23 stations and EGP 20 for longer journeys.

Press reports say the government is seeking approximately EGP 3 billion in additional revenue in 2026/27. The cited figures describe about EGP 2 billion extra for railways, bringing revenue to EGP 12 billion, against EGP 9.5 billion in the preceding year; and about EGP 1 billion extra for NAT, bringing revenue to EGP 6.5 billion, against EGP 5.8 billion previously. Sleeping-car revenue is put at EGP 1.8 billion. The annual totals and “additional” amounts do not reconcile exactly and should be understood as the estimates reported, rather than a consistent accounting breakdown.

Borrowing on an ever larger scale

Political economy professor Karim El-Omda attributes the gap between NAT’s income and expenditure to chronic deficits and loan-financed projects. Large infrastructure requires substantial capital investment as well as operating and maintenance spending. Building metro, electric railway and monorail lines consequently relies on large loans, often in foreign currency.

Public transport differs from commercial ventures, he says: its service function makes direct financial profitability difficult. Even higher fares may not cover construction, operation and debt service. Its principal return is social—better transport for people—and a financial surplus is unlikely soon while extensive capital investment continues.

“Continued expansion into new lines and projects naturally increases financial commitments and debts, while the economic and social returns appear over the long term. But stopping borrowing would necessarily halt new projects or the completion of phases already under construction, affecting transport-network expansion plans,” he tells Zawia3.

El-Omda says the 2020 conversion to an economic authority aimed to improve management, increase reliance on internally generated resources and provide more financial and administrative independence. That included preparing feasibility studies and borrowing in NAT’s own name instead of relying directly on the general budget.

The conversion did not change the underlying financial problem, however, because NAT still executes major government projects requiring continued financing. Moving debt from the state budget to an authority does not make the obligations disappear: the state remains indirectly responsible because NAT is a government body.

He links losses at transport authorities, including Egyptian National Railways and NAT, to construction, maintenance and operating costs and reliance on loans. Management efficiency nevertheless matters. He calls for administrative restructuring, stronger oversight of boards and spending, and better management of the facilities alongside solutions to financing challenges.

Spending priorities are also relative to the areas and groups that benefit, El-Omda argues. Greater Cairo’s metro serves Egypt’s largest population concentration and main economic centre. The monorail connects new cities with the capital and offers fast, environmentally friendly public transport. People in other governorates may have different priorities.

In principle, he adds, government implementation decisions should draw on feasibility studies identifying development needs and investment viability. Such an approach could justify modern network expansion, even where the ordering of priorities remains contested.

Economic researcher Mai Kabil links the widening financial gap to rapid expansion into large transport projects without clear feasibility studies being available to the public, Parliament or researchers. Borrowing may be warranted where a project provides substantial economic or developmental returns, as with public transport serving millions. But, in her view, projects such as the high-speed railway lack sufficient disclosed information to assess their beneficiaries and compare their viability with alternatives such as upgrading existing railways.

Public projects should meet two essential tests, she tells Zawia3: economic viability and priority under resource constraints. Economics involves choosing between unlimited needs and limited finance, requiring investment to go towards the most urgent projects with the highest returns.

Kabil considers economic-authority status not necessarily the best choice. Its success depends on the management objective. For a developmental public service, it is natural for the state to cover part of the deficit as a subsidy benefiting citizens. If the authority is run commercially, it should earn enough to cover expansion—something that has not happened amid extensive loan-financed projects.

“The problem lies less in the authority’s legal status than in management and planning. It did not achieve economic efficiency after conversion, while government-guaranteed debts rose, increasing the burden on the state budget,” she says.

Losses and debts create additional budget pressure, she argues, because resources allocated to them reduce the state’s capacity to spend elsewhere. Borrowing to finance the budget deficit means that greater losses in any sector lead to more borrowing, while households bear higher transport prices without those increases resolving financial imbalances.

She calls for transport-investment priorities to be reassessed against clear economic and developmental criteria, with greater transparency about why projects are selected and how many people benefit. Public resources should be directed towards their most efficient use.

With NAT’s debt exceeding EGP 2 trillion and its funding gap widening, the crisis extends beyond a temporary deficit. It opens a wider debate over spending priorities, national-project financing and the future of economic authorities providing public services that are difficult to judge by profitability alone.

Between calls to complete projects as a development necessity and demands to reorder priorities and restructure NAT, the central challenge remains balancing transport-network development with financial sustainability.